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Abstract 
It is estimated that $1 trillion flows out of the developing and emerging economies illegally on a yearly 
basis. This affects the ability of governments to raise the tax revenue and deprive the citizens of crucial 
services. Multinational Corporations (MNCs), as one of the big player in the global economy, are 
suspected to play a role in those capital outflows. For the multinational, the outflows enable strategic 
allocation pf taxes as a mean to enhance profits. This study tests whether institutional quality and tax 
level are significant predictors of the illicit capital outflow. The analysis uses panel data regressions on 
a group of Eastern European countries for the years 2004-2013. Empirical evidence suggests that illicit 
capital outflow reduces with institutional quality and increases with the tax level. We speculate on the 
importance of cross-country coordination actions to improve the quality of the institutions not only 
domestically but also at the supranational level. 
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1. Introduction 
Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimates that each year approximately $1 trillion flows out of the 
developing and emerging economies illegally. This sum exceeds the total amount that these countries 
receive yearly from Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and aid. There are three sources of illicit 
financial outflow: crime, corruption and tax evasion (GFI, 2016). However, it is estimated that tax 
evasion is the biggest source of illicit capital outflow (OECD, 2014). Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs), as one of the big player in the global economy, are suspected to play a role in those capital 
outflows. For the multinational, the outflows enable strategic allocation pf taxes as a mean to enhance 
profits.  
Three methods most commonly used for money outflows are transfer mispricing, distorted transfer 
pricing and fake transactions (Baker, 2005). Those methods enable MNCs to exploit the asymmetries 
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that exist between high tax countries and low tax jurisdictions. 
The illicit capital outflow is uncontrollable in many of the developing countries and emerging 
economies. Those countries suffer from poor governance, weak institutions, inadequate policies and 
poor legal enforcement. Such institutional weaknesses are reflected in lack of effectiveness in 
collecting taxes and tackling corruption (OECD, 2013). The guidance from international organizations 
recommends strengthening institutional quality to prevent tax evasion. The inability to collect the taxes 
impacts the amount of tax revenue the government is able to raise. This, in turn affects the resources to 
devote towards the services for the citizens and at the same time the amount of resources that is 
available to tackle tax evasion.  
While tax evasion is not confined to a specific country, most of the literature focuses on USA and 
Western European countries due to data availability. Little explorative analysis has been conducted so 
far in emerging economies of East European ones. To this purpose, this study aims to test the 
relationships between illicit capital outflows and institutional quality and between illicit capital 
outflows and tax levels. These relationships are statistically assessed by using panel data regression on 
the group of Eastern European countries for the years 2004-2013. Empirical evidence suggests that 
illicit capital outflow increases with the level of taxation and is lower in contexts with better 
institutional quality. These results are robust to the use of several macroeconomic explanatory factors. 
In light of our findings (we?) speculate on the importance of cross-country coordination actions to 
improve the quality of the institutions not only domestically but also at the supranational level.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant background; Section 3 describes the 
variables and presents the empirical framework; Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Relevant Background 
2.1 Illicit Capital Outflow and Tax Level 
According to Milton Friedman, corporations are artificial creations and as such can’t have civic 
responsibilities. Their main obligation is to maximize the shareholders’ profits, while working within 
legal framework of the country (Friedman, 1970). Students of transaction cost analysis and comparative 
political economy take this view even further and reason that corporations, in order to maximize their 
profits, might actually act in socially irresponsible way (Campbell, 2007). This is any action that is 
committed consciously and might cause harm to the stakeholders of the company and community 
within which they operate (Campbell, 2007) (Note 1).  
Countries differ in levels of taxation and this can be an important factor in the process of business 
decision making with regards to potential locations of multinationals and their affiliates. Multinationals 
can reduce the amount of payable taxes if they locate economic activities in countries with low tax 
rates. The strategy to relocate from high to low tax jurisdictions is perceived as part of a tax 
minimization planning aiming to increase the profitability. Higher level of taxation relates to more tax 
avoidance activities. Therefore, in recent years the tendency to lower the level of the taxation across the 
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counties has not been a sporadic attitude. This occurs because it is perceived that taxation can influence 
the MNCs’ behavior in relation to investment, tax avoidance, repatriation of profits and how their 
affiliates are financed.  
Hence the first hypothesis we test is the following: 
H1: Illicit Capital Outflow is higher in contexts with higher residential tax level 
Empirical evidence suggests that the level of taxation might affect the assets allocation decision. 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) report that the 10% difference in local level of taxation accounts for the 1% 
difference in amount of local PPE (real productive assets) owned by American multinationals. 
Furthermore, Swenson (1998; cited in Hines 1999) finds evidence that US taxation affects inward FDI 
undertaken by foreign investors establishing new plants, plant expansions, mergers and acquisition. 
High local taxes are negatively correlated with opening of the new plants and plants expansions. Mutti 
(2003), in examining the determinants of tax level and its changes across countries, finds that some 
countries with the initial higher level of taxation as well as small countries are more prone to lower 
their tax levels over the time. Still, setting the correct level of taxation requires careful investigation of 
the reasons why tax avoidance occurred on first place. This is because increased taxation and excessive 
regulatory obligations might drive the businesses out of the market, or push the businesses into a grey 
zone (Kenyon, 2007).  
Excessive taxation can lead to both tax avoidance and tax evasion. Tax avoidance and tax evasion 
matter. Both activities create distorted competitiveness between the organizations that pay taxes and 
those that manage to avoid them, leaving the organizations that pay higher taxes in underprivileged 
situation of being less competitive (Keynon, 2007). Tax evasion matters also for the host country as the 
lower level of the revenue directly affects the level of public services provided to its citizens. A major 
proportion of MNC’s trade is made up of transactions between entities that are part of the same 
multinational group often located in different tax jurisdictions. This supranational position can be 
exploited by the MNC by adopting creative ways of accounting to manifest profits in lower taxed 
places or hide it in the high tax jurisdictions.  
There are two major ways how the MNC can shift the profit from high tax to lower tax jurisdictions.  
The first includes the loans extending from the parent to affiliates used to finance the subsidiary. The 
interests generated and paid back to the multinational parent’s company decrease the taxable income of 
the affiliate, and create taxable interests of the parent. In case of financing the affiliates by the equity 
funding, the profit is not taxed until repatriated back to home country. Empirical evidence shows a 
tendency to finance affiliates located in high tax jurisdictions by debt and use the equity funds in case 
of the low tax countries (Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003; Hines & Rise, 1994).  
The second is transfer pricing. This indicates the practice of arbitrary selecting the price for goods and 
services traded between controlled or related legal entities within an organization. The invoicing can 
cover loans, patents, trademarks and expertise or any other commodity that are jointly used. According 
to the survey carried by UNCTAD in 1995 80% of respondents believe that MNCs engage in the 
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transfer pricing to minimize fiscal burdens (Reuter, 2008; 2012). Transfer pricing can lead to distorted 
competitiveness between MNC and local firms. For this reason the OECD has introduced a set of 
guidelines defining the rules for the MNCs in relation to the pricing strategy and a set of guidelines for 
countries to effectively combat the problem. This implies the notion of ‘arms-length’ where 
intracompany transactions should be approached in the same way as transactions between unrelated 
parties. However, this creates the technical problems of detecting and defining the abnormality. Chan 
and Chow (1997) indicate that the same transactions which appear similar might indeed be different in 
terms of the underlying facts relating to the product quality or quantity. Additionally, the distorted 
prices of intangibles are more difficult to be detected than tangibles goods. Hines and Rise (1994) 
confirm the difficulties in detecting the abnormality in the prices as in many circumstances there exist 
no comparable product outside the firm. This is especially the case of intangible goods like the 
intellectual property, patents, trademarks, expertise or high tech intermediaries traded between the 
affiliates, or parent-affiliates. Taking this point further it should be considered that the price on invoices 
might not only be arbitrary set but that the whole invoices could also be completely falsified in order to 
minimize the taxable interest. 
Transfer pricing enable to shift profits from the higher taxed to lower taxed jurisdictions as a result of 
minimizing the overall tax payment and maximizing its net profit. Transfer mispricing is, however, 
difficult to measure. Hence, many researchers focus on measuring profit shifting rather than transfer 
pricing. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2000) argue that different tax levels among the OECD countries 
might cause shift not only in the profits, using the accounting methods, but also in the real activities. In 
fact, Azemar (2008) shows how differences in the tax levels affect the allocation of investment abroad 
as well as how the profits, once generated, are reported back to the country. Also tax heavens are 
perceived to play a significant role in both tax evasion and tax avoidance (Hines & Rice, 1994). Hines 
(1991) highlights that correct policies implemented by countries might reduce the negative impact of 
low tax offshore locations. For instance, He points out that the Tax Reform of 1986 in USA has 
substantially reduced the possibilities and incentives to incorporate at those locations. 
2.2 Institutional Quality and Illicit Capital Outflow  
The level of the taxation is not the only factor determining whether corporations engage in tax 
avoidance. Countries also differ in terms of institutional quality including the quality of regulations, 
competition, political stability and infrastructure that might contribute towards the shaping overall 
investment climate of the country. A more effective system of property rights, a better quality of legal 
enforcement and state accountability can improve the market infrastructure within which economic 
agents can operate (La Porta et al., 1997; 1998). The second hypothesis we test in this paper considers 
the importance for institutional quality in mitigating illicit capital outflow. 
H2: Illicit capital outflow is lower in contexts with better institutional quality 
Solutions to global problems might be better addressed by global institutions. However, this action can 
be facilitated by the improvement of institutional quality at the country level. In other words, country’s 
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institutions and policies play crucial roles in shaping the market environment. Pande and Urdy (2005; 
cited in Casson et al., 2010) indicate that the “institutional quality might cause poor countries and 
people to stay poor”. Acemoglu (2001; 2003; cited in Cerra et al., 2008) argues that the poor 
institutions rather than poor macroeconomic policies are the main reason for the slow economic 
development. Institutions play a role in regulating the level and form of activities of the market players. 
Scott (2003; cited in Campbell, 2007) highlights that the institutions are necessary to ensure that 
organizations are responsive to the needs of other market players beside themselves. The importance of 
well-functioning institutions is reinforced by Campbell (2007) who suggests that in the absence of 
institutions regulating organizations’ behavior, market participants are more likely to act irresponsibly. 
According to North (1991) institutions are humanly devised constrains that has grown out of the need 
to minimize the uncertainty of exchange. Institutions create the incentive structure for the economy and 
indicate the directions of the economic growth of the country. Institutions participate in creation of the 
investment climate of the country, which forms the incentives structure for investors influencing the 
level of entrepreneurs in economy (Baumol, 1990). Baumol (1990) emphasizes the role of 
policymaking in allocating the entrepreneurs between productive and unproductive activities and 
stimulating their supply into the market. Institutional accountability, for instance through the quality of 
the legal enforcement, is another key factor. A well-functioning legal system seems to mitigate the 
negative impact of the heavy regulatory and tax burden. A more accountable legal system guarantees 
higher probability of detection of illegal activities and as such encourages the entrepreneurs to follow 
the formal path (Dabla-Norris et al., 2006).  
The institutional quality is important to tackle the tax evasion problem. A well-functioning bureaucratic 
machine is important in its ability of tax collection. An effective tax collection system requires a 
bureaucratic apparatus to have the ability of contacting the potential tax payer and accessing the 
information about the level of his activities (Kenyon, 2007). The tax collectors must not only be able to 
obtain necessary information about the activities of an organization, but they also have the ability and 
resources to detect possible abnormal transactions. It is emphasized that in order to be effective such 
apparatus requires professionally trained experts to assess the problems (Kenyon, 2007). The 
importance of resources is reemphasized if the country needs to challenge MNCs in the international 
arena (Azemar, 2008). This problem is especially evident in developing countries characterized by a 
lower availability of resources to dedicate in the tax collection process (Azermar, 2010). 
2.3 The Context of Analysis 
The Eastern European countries represent an intriguing context of analysis due to the geopolitical 
transition that the region has been experiencing since the end of the Cold War. Specifically to our 
context of analysis we consider the following countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania 
and Ukraine. After the 1989, these countries experience in deep structural changes affecting both their 
formal institutions and their economic infrastructure. Their gradual opening to the global market 
economy and their regional integration within the European Union has been done not without 
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institutional and economic structural modifications. Even though these changes towards a more 
democratic regime, all countries present significant differences in terms of the quality of their political 
institutions and struggle with the post transition problems that relate to corruption, tax evasion and 
crime. Yet, to various degrees, some countries remained under the influence of Russia. For instance, 
both Belarus and Ukraine were incorporated in the Soviet Union and gained independence after 1991, 
while the remaining countries created the formation of satellite countries so called the Eastern Block.  
The group is currently classified as transition economies with Poland, Hungary which are members of 
UE since 2004 and Bulgaria, Romania since 2007. 
The term “transition economies” refers to undergoing structural transformations that intend to develop 
market-based institutions as well as changing the role and the set-up of the existing ones. The major 
change is observed in the economic approach shifted from a centrally-planned to a market-based 
system where the role of the market acts as engine of growth. This is accompanied by the development 
of financial sector which takes over the leading role in stabilizing the macroeconomic situation. The 
transition of the markets and institutions are correlated with extensive privatization and economic 
liberalization. This restructuring process has been implemented to different degrees in all countries of 
the Eastern Block. The changes are reflected in the state of institutions involved in the creation of the 
investment climate of the country 
 
3. Data, Variables and Estimation Framework  
We use country-level data for the period 2004-2013 from Global Financial Integrity (GFI), World Bank 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and OECD database for six East European countries including Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. 
We model Illicit Capital Outflows as functions of institutional quality and corporate income tax level. 
Following the literature we also control for some key macroeconomic indicators such including GDP, 
GDP per capita, inflation, exchange rate and foreign direct investments (Azemar, 2010; Chan & Chow, 
1997). 
The measurement for the illicit capital outflows derives from the GFI, a non-profit international 
organization reporting on issues of illicit financial outflows in developing countries. The variable of 
Illicit Capital Outflow (ICO) is estimated by the GFI in millions of USD and consists of Trade 
Misinvoicing Outflows and Hot Money Outflows. The former refers to values on the invoice 
deliberately misreported to customs. The latter refers to flows of funds between countries aiming 
short-term profits on interest rate differences and/or anticipated exchange rate shifts (Note 2). 
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Figure 1. Illicit Capital Outflow 
 
Figure 1 shows the trend of the Illicit Capital Outflow for the countries of interests during the period of 
analysis 2004-2013. We can observe how the ICO has increassed in our sample over the years with 
highest outflow reported for the Ukraine and Poland and lowest for Belarus and Bulgaria. Peacks in the 
ICO occur for almost every countries in 2007-2009, during the period of the financial crisis.  
Institutions create the incentive structure of the economy that evolves through time and which might 
lead to growth, stagnation or decline of the economy (North, 1991). Over the recent years, an 
increasing attention has been devoting to the importance of good institutions in reducing illicit and 
amoral phenomena (Andriani, 2016; Andriani & Sabatini, 2015; Torgler, 2005). The variable 
Institutional Quality is a composite indicator summing the score of five composite items from the 
World Bank Government including Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence\Terrorism, Political Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law. Table 1 shows that 
the correlations among these composite items is high ranging from 0.52 (between the item “political 
stability” and the item “voice and accountability”) to 0.96 (between the item “rule of law” and 
“political effectiveness”). The correlations are all statistically significant at 1% statistical significant 
level. 
“Voice and Accountability” captures the citizens’ perception about the accountability of the democratic 
process in place in their respective country and electoral system.  
“Political Stability and Absence of Violence\Terrorism” indicates the perception of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. For instance, Zak (2006) 
emphasizes the importance the political stability in the investors’ asset allocation decisions as predictor 
of capital flights.  
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Table 1. Correlation among the Composite Items of Institutional Quality 
 Voice & Acc Pol. Stability Pol. Effect Reg. Quality Rule of Law 
Voice & Acc 1.00     
Pol. Stability 0.52*** 1.00    
Pol. Effect 0.89*** 0.72*** 1.00   
Reg. Quality 0.96*** 0.61*** 0.93*** 1.00  
Rule of Law 0.89*** 0.75*** 0.96*** 0.95*** 1.00 
*** p < 0.01. 
 
“Political Effectiveness” reflects the perception about the effectiveness in formulating, implementing 
and then enforcing certain policies, as well as the effectiveness in providing public services, the degree 
of its civil service independence from political pressures.  
“Regulatory Quality” reflects the perception about the ability of governments to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.  
“Rule of Law” captures the perception about the extent of the country legislative maturity. This 
indicates the strength and the stability of the legal system and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. In this 
regard, Azemar (2010) highlights the importance of the “rule of law” as determinant of multinational 
income shifting.  
The variable Tax Level derives from the PricewaterhouseCoopers and OECD database. Empirical 
evidence suggests that corporate tax level is taken in strong consideration from multinationals in asset 
allocation decisions (Clausing, 2003; Grubert & Mutti, 1991). 
As mentioned earlier the other control variables considered for our reduce form model are GDP, GDP 
per Capita, Inflation, Exchange Rate (Note 3), Foreign Direct Investments. Following the literature 
these macroeconomics indicators are included to control for different factors including but not limited 
to the attractiveness of the market for the potential entrants, macroeconomics instability, incentives 
towards transfer pricing manipulations and net investment inflows (Azemar, 2010; Grubert & Mutti, 
1991; Hines & Rise, 1994; Chan & Chow, 1997). All these indicators are derived from the World Bank 
Indicators database.  
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Illicit Capital Outflow 60 8.55 .80 6.47 9.95 
Institutional Quality 60 12.99 3.27 6.78 17.53 
Tax Level (CIT) 60 18.78 5.00 10 30 
Ln GDP 60 25.30 .80 23.86 26.99 
Ln GDP per cap 60 8.73 .59 7.88 9.53 
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Ln FDI 60 22.36 1.17 18.91 25.04 
Inflation 60 7.83 9.82 .89 59.22 
Ln Exchange Rate  50 4.58 .07 4.40 4.75 
 
Table 3. Empirical Analysis  
Variables 
Institutional Quality 
Column I 
Tax Level 
Column II 
Full Model 
Column III 
Institutional Quality -0.195** 
(0.085) 
 -.720** 
(0.200) 
Tax Level  0.089*** 
(0.017) 
0.091*** 
(0.031) 
Ln GDP   1.326*** 
(0.317) 
Ln GDP per Capita   2.064** 
(0.455) 
Ln FDI   0.650** 
(0.083) 
Ln Exchange Rate   -2.290* 
(1.086) 
Constant 10.690 
(0.987) 
6.800 
(0.344) 
-38.724*** 
(9.237) 
N. Obs. 40 40 30 
R Sq. (Overall) 0.466 0.411 0.664 
Note. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Standard errors in parenthesis. We use cluster-robust 
covariance estimator to deal with heteroskedasticity and non-equicorrelated errors over time, as in 
Andriani (2014) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005). The simple regressions follows a random effect 
estimation while the full model a fixed effect estimation  
 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of our variables. The empirical analysis depicted in tables 3 aims 
to test our hypotheses. The bivariate regressions (Column I and II) are conducted on the basis of a 
random-effect panel estimations approach while the full model (Column III) on the basis of a 
fixed-effect panel estimations approach as suggested by the Hauseman Test conducted. In our empirical 
analysis, all variables, except for institutional quality, tax level are converted into natural logarithms.  
Recalling the hypotheses H1 and H2 illicit capital outflow is expected to increase with tax level and to 
reduce with institutional quality.  
The results in Table 3 support both the hypotheses. Column I and Column II indicate that illicit capital 
outflow is lower in context with better institutional quality and increases with tax level. Column III 
shows that these results are robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic controls and to country 
characteristics. In Column III the estimations suggest that to a 1 point scale increase in institutional 
quality, corresponds a decrease in illicit capital outflow of about 72%. Still, an increase of 1% in tax 
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level is significantly correlated to an increase in illicit capital outflow of 9.1%. 
 
4. Conclusions  
Empirical evidence supports the hypotheses that illicit capital outflow increases with tax level and 
reduces in contexts with higher institutional quality. Our results, however, require considerable caution 
especially due to the small sample size. We mitigate this problem by using cluster-robust covariance 
estimators to deal with heteroskedasticity and non-equicorrelated errors over time, as in Andriani (2014) 
and Cameron and Trivedi (2005). Additionally, both bivariate and multivariate regressions seem to 
provide very similar findings. We strongly believe that our study should encourage a more consistent 
analysis focusing on developing and emerging economies. The use of data at the industry level along 
with macro data would conduct a more robust and sophisticated analysis able to capture the 
relationships between micro and macro dynamics, essentials for appropriate policy recommendations. 
Nevertheless, in light of our empirical evidence, possible speculations can be expressed towards the 
importance of improving the institutional framework in the emerging economies and not only. 
Illicit Capital Outflow has been at forefront of international agenda during recent years. Peter Gillespe 
(2012) estimates that every additional dollar in debt service means 29 cents less spending on public 
health and each $40,000 reduction in health expenditures translates into an additional infant death. 
Curbing the ICO is essential in the process of raising development indicators and tax evasion accounts 
for substantial part of that problem. The case of tax avoidance by multinationals provoked public 
outrage and surfaced at the G8 meeting creating a platform for a multilateral dialog. One of the 
outcomes of the meeting was to stress the importance of combating illicit capital outflow by increasing 
international cooperation and bringing more transparency into trade. Enhanced international 
cooperation would encourage the exchange of information between the countries and reduce the 
information asymmetries existing between countries and multinationals. To this purpose, a strategy of 
more consistent coordination actions could improve international and domestic regulations. In fact, 
evidence points out that the offshore tax heavens are the final destination only for part of the funds, 
remaining ends up on the bank accounts of the developed countries (Gillespe, 2012). Institutional 
quality is one of the main instruments that can mitigate illicit flows. Improvements in institutional 
quality should be considered not only at the domestic level but also and consistently at the 
supranational one. The consolidated political effort should lead towards confrontation of the tax 
heavens as well as towards the enforcement of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) and 
mutual legal assistance treaties (Reuter, 2012, p. 284). 
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Notes 
Note 1. The author emphasizes importance of the institutional constraints that regulate the behavior of 
the market players and points that the deregulation of the financial sector of US economy created the 
incentives and environment that allowed organizations to act in more socially irresponsible way. 
Note 2. More technical details about the illicit capital outflow measures computed by the GFI are 
available in http://www.gfintegrity.org/issues/data-by-country/ 
Note 3. Notice that this variable is being provided for five out of six countries therefore it is only 
included in first part of analysis. 
 
